

object: things that do not change (necessary truths)	}	<b>INTELLIGENCE</b> ( <i>nous</i> ) 6.6..... knowledge of insight (into definitions and self-evident principles)
		<b>SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE</b> ( <i>epistēmē</i> ) 6.3. knowledge of demonstration and conclusion
		<b>WISDOM</b> ( <i>sophia</i> ) 6.7..... regards things valued most highly, comprises intelligence & science
object: things that do change (contingent things: actions, productions; feelings toward others)	}	<b>ART</b> ( <i>technē</i> ) 6.4..... regards production
		<b>PRUDENCE</b> ( <i>phronēsis</i> ) 6.5..... regards action and commands to do what is good
		<b>UNDERSTANDING</b> ( <i>synesis</i> ) 6.10..... is similar to prudence, but does not issue commands
		<b>GOOD SENSE</b> ( <i>gnōmē</i> ) 6.11..... sympathetic understanding, capacity to forgive and to be fair

**INTELLIGENCE (INSIGHT)**

The starting point for scientific knowledge cannot be the object of scientific knowledge, art, or prudence (6.6.1140b33–35). It is intelligence that apprehends the fundamental principles of knowledge (1141a8): either definitions (6.8.1142a26) or self-evident statements, which cannot be demonstrated and they do not need demonstration. Aristotelian examples: the principle of non-contradiction (something cannot be the case and not be the case, in the same respect); the principle of causality (each effect requires a sufficient cause). Further example: “The good is to be done, evil is to be avoided” (the first principle of ethics, according to Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IaIIae.94.2.) Taken in a larger sense, intelligence also grasps the ultimate contingent fact and the minor premise in the practical syllogism (6.11.1143b1–3).

**SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE**

The object of scientific knowledge are unchangeable, necessary truths (6.3.1139b20–23). Scientific knowledge is the capacity of demonstration (1139b32). Example: “Acts of justice are good, therefore they are to be done.” This argument rests on the premise that the good is to be done (which premise we know by intelligence).

**WISDOM**

Wisdom is the most precise and perfect form of knowledge: the knowledge of the things that are valued most highly. It comprises both intelligence and scientific knowledge (6.7.1141a16–21). Wisdom without prudence is possible but useless (1141b3–8).

**ART (CRAFT KNOWLEDGE)**

Production is a different activity from action: “production has an end other than itself, but action does not: good action is an end in itself.” (6.5.1140b5–7; cf. 2.4.1105a26–34). Art is production under the guidance of right reason. Art does not imply that you produce in a virtuous way; its criteria is only that the product is good (e. g. that a chair is solid).

**PRUDENCE**

Virtues aim at a median that right reason establishes (2.6.1107a1–2). They also involve choice. Choice is ‘deliberate desire’: good choice implies a good reasoning and a good desire (6.2.1139a22–25). Ethics in general is action according to right reason (2.2.1103b31–32). Now “right reason in moral matters is prudence” (6.13.1144b27). Prudence is a “truthful characteristic of acting rationally in matters good and bad for man” (6.5.1140b4–5. 20–21). A person of prudence de-

liberates well concerning that which contributes to the good life in general; prudence only regards good ends (6.5.1140a24–32; 6.12.1143b23). Prudence is on the opposite pole from intelligence: intelligence grasps the (abstract) definitions, prudence regards the particular facts (6.8.1142a23–27); therefore it requires experience (6.7.1141b14–21, 6.8.1142a12–20). It not only makes us know what is good, but also commands to do it (6.10.1143a6–9). Moral virtues make us aim at the right target, prudence makes us use the right means (6.12.1144a7–9). Without prudence, the moral virtues cannot be had and vice versa (6.12–13).

**UNDERSTANDING**

Like prudence, understanding regards matters in which doubt and deliberation are possible; but unlike prudence, it does not command to do actions (6.10.1143a7–9). It is the “faculty of opinion in judging statements made by another person about matters which belong to the realm of prudence (1143a14–15).

**GOOD SENSE (SYMPATHETIC UNDERST.)**

A person has good sense if he or she is able to forgive others and if he or she judges well what is fair or equitable (6.11.1143a18–24).